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THE CASE OF JOHN SALVI: ETHICAL BINDS WHEN
REPRESENTING THE INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT
I. INTRODUCTION
When a defense attorney, prosecutor, or judge has a reasonable
doubt concerning a defendant's competence to stand trial, she has a
duty to raise the issue with the court, or in the case of a judge, to
investigate the issue.' At times, this duty may conflict with other
duties imposed upon counsel, such as a defense attorney's duty to
represent the wishes of her client. It is this conflict that is the focus of
this comment, with some emphasis placed on the law in
Massachusetts.
The history and current state of the law regarding defendants'
competency to stand trial is analyzed in the next section, followed by
a section devoted to a discussion of conflicts that can arise around the
issue of defendants' competence to stand trial. A section is then
devoted to distinguishing the related question of whether defense
counsel may assert an insanity defense over the defendant's objection.
Section V introduces the case of John Salvi and the ethical
conflict his attorneys faced when confronted with what they believed
to be an incompetent client.2 The law of amicus curiae is discussed in
section VI. Section VII examines the use of amicus counsel in Salvi
to resolve the conflict faced by Salvi's counsel and the problems that
arose. Finally, this comment concludes with a discussion of the use of
amicus counsel in Savi, together with some slight variations, as
potential answers to the ethical conflict that arises when counsel has a
reasonable doubt as to the competence of the defendant, but the
defendant does not want his competency questioned.

'See ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 7-4.2 (2d ed. 1986).
2 Commonwealth v. Salvi (Mass. Super. Ct.) (Nos. 99518-24).
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II. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
"The conviction of an accused person while he is legally
incompetent violates due process."3 This prohibition is fundamental
to an adversary system of justice and predates the practice of legal
representation. 4
The concept that a defendant must have the mental
capacity to stand trial, of course, arose at a time when
a defendant was not entitled to have counsel assigned.
Since it was contemplated that a defendant would be
conducting his own defense, it was held that he could
not be brought to trial unless he had sufficient mental

See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). Accord Commonwealth
v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 51-52, 375 N.E.2d 1168, 1169 (1978) (explaining that trial,
conviction, or sentencing of legally incompetent defendant violates Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article Twelve of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights); see also Commonwealth v. Wayne W.,
414 Mass. 218, 226, 606 N.E.2d 1323, 1328 (1993) (recognizing that due process
and equal protection bars against trial of incompetent individuals are guaranteed
by both Fourteenth Amendment and Massachusetts Constitution); Harding v.
Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that due process requires
competency hearing whenever court has good-faith doubt concerning defendant's
competency); Manning v. Texas, 766 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming that the conviction of an accused while he is legally incompetent to
stand trial violates due process); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)
(holding that criminal defendant may not be tried unless competent). But cf.
Commonwealth v. Dias, 402 Mass. 645, 649, 524 N.E.2d 846, 849 (1988)
(holding that failure to conduct a court-ordered competency examination was not
reversible error).
4 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) (per curiam)
(explaining that prohibition against trial of incompetent defendant is
"fundamental" to adversary system of justice). "The constitutional implications
of the competency issue rest upon principles fundamental to our adversary system
of justice." Manning v. Texas, 766 S.W.2d at 554.
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capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in
his own defense.... 5
This concept dates back even to the time of Blackstone, who wrote:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital
offence, and before arraignment for it, he becomes
mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is
not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that
he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner
becomes mad, he 6 shall not be tried; for how can he
make his defence?
Though the prohibition against trial of an incompetent defendant
precedes the modem practice of representation by counsel, the fact
that an incompetent defendant may be represented does not vitiate the
bar against his being tried.7 This has its roots in the English common
law:
Assuming the prisoner to be insane at the time of
arraignment, he cannot be tried at all, with or without
counsel, for, even assuming that he has appointed
counsel at a time when he was sane, it is not fit that he
should be tried, as he cannot understand the evidence,
nor the proceedings, and so is unable to instruct

See New York v. Reason, 334 N.E.2d 572, 574 (N.Y. 1975). See also H.
Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 428-29, 431 (1954). "It has
long been the rule of the common law that a person cannot be required to plead to
an indictment or be tried for a crime while he is so mentally disordered as to be
incapable of making a rational defense." Id. For a relatively in-depth exposition
of the related topic of the development of the right to counsel and selfrepresentation, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). It should be noted
that competence is distinguished from criminal responsibility. Criminal
responsibility goes to the merits of the case, and may be dispositive regarding the
defendant's guilt. See Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. 393, 402, 471
N.E.2d 353, 359 n. 2 (1984) (distinguishing competence to stand trial from
insanity defense).
6 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
24.
'See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
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counsel, or to withdraw his authority if he acts
improperly, as a prisoner may always do.'
The standard for competency to stand trial is identical to the
standard for competency to waive Constitutional rights. 9 The
Supreme Court, in Dusky v. United States,'° articulated the standard
to be applied when determining the competency of a defendant to be
tried as "whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him."'" In Drope v. Missoln;' 2 the Supreme
Court further held that the defendant must have the capacity to assist
in preparing his defense. 3 The court in Drope went on to note that
' Regina v. Southey, 4 Fos. & Fin. 864, 872 n. a, 176 Eng. Rep. 825, 828 n. a
(N.P. 1865).
9See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-98 (1993), noted in Moran v.
Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1995). But cf. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
at 412-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that standard of competency should
be different depending on the purpose for which it is disputed).
1362 U.S. 402 (1960).
"Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). Accord
Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. at 398-99, 471 N.E.2d at 356-57;
Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 52, 375 N.E.2d 1168, 1169 (1978);
Manning v. Texas, 766 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). "The focus of the
Dusky standard is on a particular level of mental functioning, which the ability to
consult counsel helps identify." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. at 404 (Kennedy, J.
dissenting). Accord Manning v. Texas, 766 S.W.2d at 554 ("[Tlhe defendant
must be able to participate in or assist counsel in the conduct of the defense ...
[and] have the mental ability to control the decision-making process."). The
court in Manning went on to say:
Our judicial system assumes that truth and justice result from the clash
of adversaries. The adversaries in a criminal case, however, are not
lawyers but are a defendant and the State. The United States
Constitution guarantees more than a right to counsel. The fundamental
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is the defendant's right to control
and participate in his defense.
Id. at 554.
12420 U.S. 162 (1965).
See Drope v.Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
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"[tihere are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably
indicate the need for further inquiry to determine [competency]; the
question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of
manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated."14
Among the evidence that may require a hearing to investigate the
defendant's competency to stand trial are evidence of prior irrational
behavior, prior medical opinions, and demeanor at trial. 5 This
hearing is, in theory, essentially non-adversarial, as the question to be
determined is not guilt or innocence but simply whether the trial can
continue at that time. 16 Jurisdictions differ on who carries the burden
of proof in a competency hearing and by what standard competence
or incompetence must be proven.17 Thus, though the Supreme Court
has held that it is permissible to put the burden on the defendant to
prove he is incompetent, Massachusetts, for one, has placed the
burden on the prosecution to prove that a defendant is competent
once the question has been raised. '
Likewise, Massachusetts
requires that competence can be established by a preponderance of
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 180.
" See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 180; Commonwealth v. Hill, 375
Mass. at 54-55, 375 N.E.2d at 1171; Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 695 (9th
Cir. 1995); Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1987). But see
Commonwealth v. Martin, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 98, 616 N.E.2d 814, 816 (1993)
(holding that not every instance of abnormal behavior or sign of mental disorder
will compel a competency hearing). Cf. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. at 402
("It is not enough [to establish competency] for the ... judge to find that the
defendant is oriented to time and place and has some recollection of events.").
16 See Manning v. Texas, 766 S.W.2d
551, 554-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
Jurisdictions are split on which party carries the burden of proving competency or
incompetency once the issue has been raised. Most jurisdictions require only a
preponderance of the evidence to prove competence, but at least one requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 18-19.
Compare Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. at 400, 471 N.E.2d at
357-58 (holding that prosecution carries the burden of proving competency), and
Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 573, 651 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1995)
(affirming trial judge's allocation of burden to prosecution), with Moran v.
Godinez, 57 F.3d at 700 (allowing defendant to carry burden of proving
incompetence), and Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1992) (same).
14
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the evidence, as do most jurisdictions, while Maryland, for one, has
held that competence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 19
The burden of ensuring that an incompetent defendant is not tried
falls both on the court and the attorneys. 20 The judge has a
responsibility imposed by the Constitution to ensure that an
incompetent defendant is not tried. 1 In Massachusetts and in most
federal circuits, the judge must hold a competency hearing whenever
"a substantial question of possible doubt" is raised regarding the
defendant's competency.22 Under a recent Massachusetts decision,
even appellate courts have explicit authority to raise the question of a
defendant's competency sua sponte, even when the issue was not
raised at the trial level.23 Under Commonwealth v. Simpson,24 the
correct remedy in such a situation is for the court to order a hearing
on a motion for a new trial, rather than reversal of the conviction. 25
'9 Compare Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. at 401-02, 471 N.E.2d at
358-59 (requiring competence to be proven by preponderance of the evidence),
and Commonwealth v. Simpson, 428 Mass. 646, 654, 704 N.E.2d 1131, 1136
(1999) (recognizing that competence must be proven by preponderance of
evidence), with Jolley v. Maryland, 384 A.2d 92, 94, 282 Md. 353, 357 (1978)
(holding that competence must be proven beyond reasonable doubt).
20See Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that due
process requires court to initiate competency proceedings); Manning v. Texas,
766 S.W.2d at 554 (ruling that state must protect defendant's due process right
not to be tried when incompetent); New York v. Reason, 353 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452
(App. Div. 1974) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The state may not, and must provide
adequate safeguards to ensure that it will not, convict a legally incompetent
person of a crime.").
2 See supra notes 3, 20 and accompanying text.
22 Rhay
v. White, 385 F.2d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1967).
Accord

Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. at 399, 471 N.E.2d at 357;
Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 54, 375 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (1978).
23See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 428 Mass. 646, 649, 704 N.E.2d 1131,
1133 (1999) (affirming jurisdiction of intermediate appellate court to consider
competence of defendant sua sponte).
24428 Mass. 646, 704 N.E.2d 1131 (1999).
25 Id. at 654, 704 N.E.2d at 1136. The facts giving rise to the question of the
defendant's competence arose during trial, after jeopardy had attached. Id. at
652-53, 704 N.E.2d at 1135. The court acknowledged that typically a judge
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In other jurisdictions, such as Maine, the standard is slightly
different: only if the trial court learns from "observation, reasonable
claim or credible source that there is a genuine doubt of the accused's
competency" does the court have a duty to inquire concerning the
defendant's competence to stand trial.26 Under ABA Standard for
Criminal Justice 7-4.2, in jurisdictions such as Massachusetts that
have either adopted or credited these standards, and in other
jurisdictions by judicial decision, both the prosecutor and defense
counsel have an ethical obligation to raise the issue of the defendant's
competency whenever they have a good faith doubt concerning the
defendant's competence to stand trial.27

should conduct a competency hearing if and when the judge should suspect the
defendant may be incompetent, even if in the middle of a trial. Id. at 653 n.6,
704 N.E.2d at 1135 n.6. The court then stated, without explanation, that the
possibility of conducting such a hearing in this case was "nil." Id.
26 Maine v. Hewett, 538 A.2d 268, 269 (Me.
1988) (quoting Clement v.
Maine, 458 A.2d 69, 71 (Me. 1983)). "The necessity for an inquiry under the
particular circumstances addresses itself to the sound discretion of the court and
its decision will not be disturbed except for arbitrary action or abuse of judicial
discretion." Thursby v. Maine, 223 A.2d 61, 68-69 (Me. 1966).
27 See ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 7-4.2 (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter
Standard 7-4.2]. The Supreme Court of Kansas, for example, stated prior to the
adoption of the ABA Standards:
It is a well-settled rule in this state that whenever counsel for
defendant or the state becomes possessed of knowledge of a
defendant's lack of mental capacity to comprehend his situation or to
properly make his defense, it becomes the duty of each to promptly
bring the matter to the attention of the court.
Kansas v. Smith, 173 Kan. 813, 815, 252 P.2d 922, 923 (1953). See also Evans
v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp 218, 220-21 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (holding that failure of
prosecutor to raise issue of defendant's incompetence violates due process);
Chernoff & Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 505, 519 (1972) (suggesting that failure of defense counsel to
notify court of defendant's incompetence may constitute fraud upon the court).
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice also place the burden on the prosecutor,
defense counsel and the court. Standard 7-4.2 reads, in part:
(a) The court has a continuing obligation, separate and apart from that
of counsel for each of the parties, to raise the issue of incompetence to
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Other jurisdictions place no duty to raise competency issues on
the prosecutor, relying instead on the judgment of defense counsel.28
Thus, in all jurisdictions, and under the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, defense counsel in particular has an obligation to raise the
issue of the defendant's competency whenever he has a good faith
doubt whether the defendant is competent to stand trial, regardless of
the defendant's wishes. 29 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 74.2(c), the paragraph pertaining to the responsibility of defense
counsel, reads:
Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the
defendant's competence to stand trial whenever the
defense counsel has a good faith doubt as to the
defendant's competence. If the client objects to such a
motion being made, counsel may move for evaluation
over the client's objection. In any event, counsel
should make known to the court and to the prosecutor
those facts known to counsel which raise the good
faith doubt of competence.3 °

stand trial.... (b) The prosecutor should move for evaluation of
defendant's competence to stand trial whenever the prosecutor has a
good faith doubt as to the defendant's competence....
Id.; see also infra note 30 and accompanying text. Massachusetts has not
explicitly adopted the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. However, significant
weight is given to the Standards by the Massachusetts courts. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. St. Germain, 381 Mass. 256, 261-62 n.8, 408 N.E.2d 1358,
1363 n.8 (1980) (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice); Commonwealth
v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 734, 587 N.E.2d 194, 203 (1992) (citing ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 501 n.3, 574
N.E.2d 974, 976 n.3 (1991) (same). These are only a few of more than fifty cases
affirmatively citing or quoting the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.
28 See Thursby v. Maine, 223 A.2d at 68 (initial responsibility for raising
question of incompetence is on defense counsel); Illinois v. Maynard, 347 Ill.
422, 430, 179 N.E. 833, 837 (1932) (same).
29See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
30 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-4.2(c) (2d ed. 1986). Chapter 7,
the Mental Health Standards, was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on
August 7, 1984.

19991

THE CASE OFJOHN SAL VI

As the Commentary to ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 7-4.2
acknowledges, this obligation may put defense counsel in an ethical
bind, involving issues of attorney-client confidentiality, the attorney's
duty to represent the wishes of the client, and the duty to advocate
zealously. 3
III. CONFLICTING RESPONSIBILITIES
There are four issues that arise from the juxtaposition of
potentially conflicting duties owed by an attorney both to the
attorney's client and as an officer of the court.32 First, the
prosecution or defense counsel may misuse the issue of competence
and the competency determination process.33 Secondly, Defense

3 See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in
Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate of Officer of
the Court? 1988 Wis. L. REV. 65 (Jan. - Feb. 1988). Uphoff's article provides an
in-depth and very critical discussion of defense attorneys' obligation to raise the
issue of incompetency, as well as a proposal for relief from that obligation. Id.
The conclusion of Uphoff's client-centered argument is that defense counsel
should be left to make a case-by-case decision based on what the lawyer
determines to be in the best interest of the defendant. Id. at 109. This approach,
though perhaps resulting in preferable results for the defendant when they have
competent counsel, seems to ignore the fact that trial of an incompetent
defendant is an affront to the United States Constitution. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
32 See Gerald Bennett, Symposium of the ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards: A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards Relating to
Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985)
(identifying three areas of conflict); see generally Uphoff, supra note 31
(discussing distinct conflict when finding of incompetency would be adverse to
defendant).
" Id. "It is improper for either party to use the incompetence process for
purposes unrelated to incompetence to stand trial such as to obtain information
for mitigation of sentence, to obtain favorable plea negotiations, or to delay the
proceedings against the defendant." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-4.2(e)
(2d ed. 1986).
Studies have indicated that misuse of the competency
determination process in these ways is quite common. Bennett, supra note 32, at
381-83 (citing studies on the misuse of competency procedures). In an interview
conducted during research for this article, an experienced defense attorney
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counsel's obligation to relay to the court information that is relevant
to an assessment of competence can conflict with a client's assertion
of the attorney-client privilege or a promise of confidentiality.34
Third, the defendant's best interests may be adverse to a finding of
incompetency. 35 Finally, there is a potential conflict between a
defense attorney's obligation to raise the issue of competence and his
client's wishes.3 6 This article is primarily concerned with the last of
these potential conflicts.
There have been several studies conducted concerning the misuse
of the doctrine of incompetence to stand trial.37 For example, one
study determined that the competency issue was frequently used not
to ensure a fair trial, but for "handling situations and solving problems
38
for which there seemed to be no other recourse under the law."
Another study found that attorneys used the competency issue not
only to ensure a constitutionally sound trial, but also "to remove
public pressure for severe punishment, to avoid a jury trial on the
responsibility issue, or to lay the groundwork for a not guilty by
reason of insanity plea where the crime would result in a long
sentence., 39 Other misuses have included the use of the system by
defense counsel as a substitute for civil commitment proceedings, to
obtain a free psychiatric evaluation, or to delay the proceedings in
referred to the "competency defense," in perhaps tacit acknowledgement of the
potentially tactical applications of the issue.
34 See Bennett, supra note 32, at 381-83.
See also ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice 7-4.2(0 (2d ed. 1986) (discouraging disclosure during
competency determination process of confidential communications or
communications protected by attorney-client privilege); ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6 (1997).
31 See Uphoff, supra note 31, at 71-72 (discussing conflicting duties
when
finding of incompetency adverse to best interest of defendant).
36 See Bennett, supra
note 32, at 381.
37 See Bennett, supra note 32, at 381 (citing studies concerning misuse
of
competency procedures).
" See id. at 382 (quoting Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial:
Procedures,Results and Problems, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713, 715 (1963)).
See Bennett, supra note 32, at 382 (quoting Cooke, Johnston & Pogany,
FactorsAffecting Referral to Determine Competency to Stand Trial, 130 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 870, 874 (1973)).
39
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hope of some favorable result.4 ° Prosecutors, it has been alleged,
misuse the process to incapacitate a defendant when they lack
sufficient evidence for a conviction at trial.41
To varying degrees depending on jurisdiction, attorneys are
prohibited from disclosing information concerning the case without
the permission of their client. 42 When compelled to raise the issue of
competence to stand trial, though, defense counsel must submit to the
43
court "the specific facts that have formed the basis for the motion.
Thus, the problems involved with disclosure of information and
communications by defense counsel must be weighed against the
court's need to obtain the information necessary to order a
competency hearing and to make an informed decision concerning the
defendant's competence.
To resolve this conflict, the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice conclude that an attorney must disclose
the facts on which a motion for a competency evaluation is based and
may testify or be questioned by the court concerning her observations
of the client. 45 Defense counsel may not, however, disclose the
substance of attorney-client communications and neither the court nor
40

See Bennett, supra note 32, at 382; see, e.g., Eizenstat, Mental Cometency

to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 379, 384 (1968) (citing use of
incompetency procedures in place of civil commitment); Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 466 (1981) (condemning use of competency hearing to obtain
psychiatric evaluations for later use); Roesch, A Brief, Immediate Screening
Interview to Determine Competency to Stand Trial, 5 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 241,
242 (1978) (finding use of competency proceeding to obtain advance psychiatric
information); Slovenko, The Developing Law on Competency to Stand Trial, 5 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 166 (1977) (same); Wesler & Scoville, Incompetency to
Stand Trial, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 160, 161-62 (1971) (delaying proceedings by
raising competency issue).
41 See Bennett, supra note 32, at 382.
42 See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 (1997).
Different
jurisdictions have adopted different variations of Model Rule 1.6, though most
changes concern the exceptions allowing disclosure, rather than the prohibition.
See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 74-78 (1998
ed.) (listing variations on rule by state).
4'ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-4.2(d) (2d ed. 1986).
44See Bennett, supra note 32, at 386-87.
41 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-4.2(c)
(2d ed. 1986).
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prosecution may obtain from defense counsel the substance
of
46
privilege.
attorney-client
the
by
protected
communications
Competency evaluations are usually conducted on an inpatient
basis and may result in lengthy hospitalization.47 Therefore, when
attorneys for defendants charged with relatively minor offenses raise
competency, the defendants may be deprived of more of their liberty
than they would lose if convicted.48 Prior to the United States
Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana,49 commitment
for treatment to restore competence was indeterminate, often
unreviewed, and sometimes resulted in commitment for life rather
than a short-term stay for treatment.5 ° Sometimes a defense attorney
will believe it to be in the defendant's best interest not to raise the
issue of competency due to the weakness of the prosecution's case
and the likelihood of a verdict of not guilty. 5 '
Finally, at times a defendant will not want to be found
incompetent and may instruct the attorney not to raise the issue.52
This is often the case where the alleged crime was motivated by
loyalty to a political "cause."53 In such cases, the defendant is loath
to be found incompetent or insane because such a finding could
detract from the credibility of the political message they hope to
46

Compare ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-4.2(0 (2d ed. 1986)
(mandating certain disclosures), with ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 74.8(b)(i)-(ii) & commentary at 229-31 (2d ed. 1986) (prohibiting certain
disclosures).
47See Uphoff, supra note 3 1, at
71.
41 See Uphoff, supra note
31, at 72.
49 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
The Court limited the length of time a
defendant may be committed for determination of competency to the amount of
time it takes to determine the likelihood of treatment resulting in competency.
Id. For longer commitments, the government must commence civil commitment
proceedings. Id.
'oSee Hess & Thomas, supra note 38, at 716 (finding that competency
evaluation procedures often result in "incarceration, for life").
5'See Bennett, supra note 32, at 384.
52Id. at 385.
See Phillip J. Resnick, The Political Offender: Forensic Psychiatric
Considerations,6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 388, 391 (1978).
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convey.14 Whatever the motivation for refusing to raise incompetence,
such a refusal on the part of the defendant can put defense counsel in
an ethical bind between the duty to advocate zealously for their client
and the duty to raise the issue of competency to stand trial." If a
lawyer raises competency over the objection of the defendant, he may
be fired, resulting in a defense the likes of that given by Colin
Ferguson in his New York trial for murder.5 6 While competent
defendants have the constitutional right to defend themselves
pro se,
7
commentators seem to agree that this is not preferable.
IV. CONFLICTS DISTINGUISHED
There is a related issue that has recently received much publicity
through the trial of Theodore Kaczynski: may defense counsel assert
a defense of lack of criminal responsibility, or insanity, over the
defendant's objection?58 In cases such as Kaczynski's, defense
counsel may be caught between the wishes of the defendant and a
sincere belief that an insanity defense is in the defendant's best
interest. 9 Counsel has an obligation to exercise professional
14

Id. at 391-92.

See Uphoff, supra note 3 1, at 65 ("The role of the criminal defense lawyer
is to provide zealous representation within the bounds of the law."); ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble (1997) ("As advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client's position....").
'6See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Jon Kerr, Kentucky and
Wisconsin Cases Point Out Legal,
"

Ethical Complexities of Raising an Insanity Defense Over a Client's Opposition,
11-17-95 WEST'S LEGAL NEWS 3860. For example, following the case of Colin
Ferguson, who represented himself in his defense against ninety-three counts for
the killing of six people and wounding of nineteen, it was predicted that the
"bizarre example of the right to self-representation... might provoke a backlash
against other criminal defendants seeking to exercise their rights to represent
themselves in court." Id.
" United States v. Theodore John Kaczynski, No. Cr. S-96-259 GEB (E.D.
Ca. 1996). Theodore Kaczynski was charged with numerous offenses involving
the mailing of bombs as the Unabomber. Id.
"9The law is far from clear on whether the defendant or the attorneys control
the choice of what defense to raise. In Kaczynski, after months of ex parte
negotiations between the defendant and his counsel, in which the trial judge
mediated, the defendant attempted to dismiss his lawyers because of their intent
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judgment in zealous advocacy of the client's cause, but the defendant
has the last say concerning what plea to assert, which may include the
decision whether to assert an insanity defense. 60 This contrasts with
the conflict surrounding competency because of the constitutional
implications of the trial of an incompetent defendant. 6 Moreover, the
context in which competency issues are addressed further
distinguishes the two situations: competency is addressed in a
theoretically non-adversarial proceeding while the insanity defense is
asserted in the midst of the adversarial arena.62 Nonetheless, the
pressures on defense counsel who believe their client is not guilty by
reason of insanity are very similar to those on defense counsel who

to present a defense involving mental illness. See generally United States v.
Kaczynski, Transcript of Proceedings January 8, 1998 (No. Cr. S-96-259 GEB).
60 See ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 4-5.2 (1992) (advising that choice
of plea is for defendant after consultation with attorney). ABA Standard 4-5.2
also assigns tactical decisions, including the choice of what evidence to
introduce, to counsel after consultation with the defendant. Id. Compare Ohio v.
Smith, 3 Ohio App. 3d 115, 118, 444 N.E.2d 85, 89 (1981) (allowing "tactical"
decision of counsel to withdraw plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" over
defendant's objection), and Weber v. Israel, 730 F.2d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 1984)
(ruling that decision to withdraw insanity plea was tactical), with California v.
Medina, 51 Cal. 3d 870, 900, 799 P.2d 1282, 1301 (1990) (ruling that decision of
whether to plead not guilty by reason of insanity was personal to defendant), and
Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1288 (11 th Cir. 1984) (holding defense
counsel ethically responsible not to enter insanity plea when so directed by
defendant). Following the court's decision in Alvord, a petition for certiorari was
filed and denied. Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 956 (1984). Justice
Marshall dissented, noting that "[the decision established that absolute deference
to the uninformed reaction of a defendant is acceptable, and that counsel's
decision not to pursue the issue and make an attempt to persuade his client is
reasonable." Id. at 959. As noted by the court in Ohio v. Smith, there is "some
uncertainty" regarding whether the decision to withdraw an insanity defense is a
strategy decision for the lawyer or a decision exclusively up to the defendant.
Ohio v. Smith, 3 Ohio App. 3d at 118, 444 N.E.2d at 89.
61 See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
61See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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believe their client is incompetent. 63

Defendants' motivations for

refusing to assert an insanity defense are often similar to defendants'
motivations for objecting to the raising of a competency issue.64
There have been several high-profile cases in the past few years
that have highlighted the potential for conflict between attorneys and
clients who wish to be found competent and perceived as sane. Colin
Ferguson, accused of killing six people and wounding nineteen, fired
his lawyers when they suggested an insanity defense, then proceeded
pro se in a spectacle that most people concerned with the law hope to
avoid in the future. 65 Ted Kaczynski, when facing trial last year for
mailing bombs as the Unabomber, attempted to fire his lawyers for
pressuring him to assert a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.66
The case of John Salvi provides an excellent example of the potential
conflict over competency that a defense attorney may face: the
conflict becomes most acute and complicated when the client
expressly wishes not to be found incompetent.67

63 See

supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. The duties imposed by

ABA Standard 7-4.2 obviously don't apply to the situation wherein a defendant is
opposed to raising a mental illness defense but the attorney believes it is the best
defense. The duty to advocate zealously, however, does apply and imposes an
affirmative obligation on defense counsel. See also supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
"See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

"See United States v. Kaczynski, Transcript of Proceedings January 8, 1998
(No. Cr. S-96-259 GEB). On the morning that the oft-delayed trial was to begin,
Kaczynski's counsel addressed the court as follows:
Your Honor, if I may address the Court, Mr. Kaczynski had a request
that we alert the Court to, on his behalf-- it is his request that he be
permitted to proceed in this case as his own counsel. This is a very
difficult position for him. He believes that he has no choice but to go
forward as his own lawyer. It is a very heartfelt reaction, I believe, to
the presentation of a mental illness defense, a situation in which he
simply cannot endure. So it is his request that the Court permit him to
proceed on his own behalf.
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V. COMMONWEAL TH OFMASSACHUSETTS v. JOHN SAL VI
John Salvi was indicted for two counts of murder in the first
degree and five counts of assault with the intent to murder. 68 He was
sent to Bridgewater State Hospital for a competency evaluation at
defense counsel's request.69 In the Motion for Appointment of
Amicus Counsel, Salvi's attorney reported that the doctor who
evaluated Salvi at Bridgewater could not determine if Salvi was
competent to stand trial.70 Salvi's counsel argued that he was not
competent under at least one prong of the Dusky standard, as he was
not able to "consult with his lavyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding."' Noting that Salvi was adamant that he was
67 See

Commonwealth's Response to Defendant's Motion for Appointment

of Amicus Counsel to Argue Incompetency, Commonwealth v. Salvi 4 n.3 (Mass.
Super. Ct.) (Nos. 99518-24). See generally Motion for Appointment of Amicus
Counsel,
Commonwealth v. Salvi (Mass. Super. Ct.) (Nos. 99518-24).
8
6 Id.at
69

1.

See Motion for Examination of the Defendant

Concerning His

Competency to Stand Trial, Commonwealth v. Salvi (Mass. Super. Ct.) (Nos.
99518-24). Defense counsel stated in the motion for a competency examination
that a substantial question had been raised as to "whether the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his attorneys with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding." Id. Attached as an exhibit to the motion were copies of
several pages of Salvi's writings. Among his statements: "If convicted of the
charge I am accussed [sic] of I wish to receive [sic] the death penalty.... If I am
not proven guilty upon release I will become a catholic priest.... What the
catholic church needs to do is to start printing a currency.... Why do the free
masons persecute the Catholic Church? Because their [sic] good at it....
Written
from Norfolk City Jail on 1/4/95 after refusing to eat tampered food for 4 days."
70 See Motion for Appointment of Amicus Counsel,
supra, at 1. See also
Transcript of Competency Hearing 33-34 (July 24, 1994).
71Motion for Appointment of Amicus Counsel, supra note 67,
at 2. The
motion also states that Salvi would neither provide counsel with any information
regarding the day of the alleged offenses, nor explain why he wouldn't:
He has asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege with both counsel and
all evaluators. He has shifted the subject to a rambling and loosely
associated monologues [sic] concerning the Catholic Church and the
persecution of Catholics. He has insisted on his right to remain silent
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competent to stand trial, counsel addressed the conflict that arose
between the duty to raise the issue of competency when there was a
reasonable doubt as to Salvi's competency and the duty to represent
the wishes of the client.72
As the Commentary Introduction to ABA Standard for Criminal
Justice 7-4.2 indicates, defense counsel has a "professional
responsibility toward the court and the fair administration of justice,
as well as an allegiance to the client .... ,7 As discussed previously,
these two responsibilities may at times conflict. 74 Thus, the ABA
Standards propose two options: move for an evaluation over the
client's objections, or, if that would deleteriously affect the attorneyclient relationship, to simply advise the court of the information that
led to counsel's doubt as to the defendant's competence.75 As several
while the government proves its case against him. He has insisted that
many issues, even those which appear to be innocuous, are "private" or
"personal." He refuses to provide counsel with any information which
might lead to the discussion of viable defenses. At the same time, the
defendant is anxious to be found competent and proceed to trial.
ld.
Id. at 4-5. The motion also cited the Commentary Introduction to ABA
Standard 7-4.2, see supra note 30, which acknowledges that moving for a
competency evaluation over the client's objection may deleteriously affect the
attorney-client relationship. Counsel was apparently convinced that to raise the
competency issue would prompt Salvi to fire his counsel and proceed pro se.
Motion for Appointment of Amicus Counsel, supra note 67, at 5. See also
Commonwealth's Response to Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Amicus
Counsel to Argue Incompetency, Commonwealth v. Salvi 4-5, n.3 (Mass. Super.
Ct.) (Nos. 99518-24). The other option suggested by the Commentary to ABA
Standard 7-4.2 is for counsel to give the court the information leading to
counsel's doubt about competency, and to then withdraw to resolve the conflict
of interest.
" ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-4.2 (2d ed. 1986).
72

74

id.

71Id.

The second option, however, as the Commentary notes, may require

counsel to seek permission to withdraw from further representation. id.; see
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 (1987). On the other hand, it is
not uncommon for defendants to fire their attorney for choosing the alternative.
See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 428 Mass. 646, 650 n.3, 704 N.E.2d 1131, 1134
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high profile cases have demonstrated, many criminal defendants
sincerely wish to be found sane, whether to avoid undermining the
perceived credibility of a political message, to avoid stigma, or
because of a perception that conditions in a state hospital are worse
than in jail. 76 Rather than pursue either to the exclusion of the other,
counsel moved the court to appoint amicus counsel to represent the
defendant in the competency hearing.77
VI. AMICUS CURIAE
"It has been said that an amicus curiae is one who gives
information to the court on some matter of law in respect to which
the court is doubtful. .. Most courts have traditionally held that the
function of amici is to give service, advice, or suggestions to the
court, not to serve a party.79
Not all courts have defined the role of amicus counsel in so
limited a fashion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has said that
"[t]here is no rule . . .that amici must be totally disinterested. ' 8 °
Another court, in Wyatt v. Rawlins,/' has gone further, holding that
"the concept of amicus curiae is flexible and ...as long as the amicus
does not intrude on the rights of the parties, it can have a range of
roles: from a passive one of providing information to a more active
participatory one.', 82 The court in Wyatt went on to identify eight
factors that can be used to determine whether the role of amicus
should active, passive, or somewhere in between: (1) the nature of
n.3 (1999) (noting that defendant proceeded pro se after firing attorney for raising
competency question). See also supra note 72.
76 See supra notes 66-67.
77See Motion for Appointment of Amicus Counsel, supra, at 1, 5.
78 City of Columbus v. Tullos, 204 N.E.2d 67 (Ohio 1964).
79See Givens v. Goldstein, 52 A.2d 725, 726 (D.C. 1947) (limiting amicus
counsel's role to that of advisor to court and disallowing amicus' management of
case); Briggs v. United States, 597 A.2d 370, 373 (D.C. 1991) (refusing appeal
by amicus curiae); Brown v. Wright, 137 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1943) (holding
that party appearing as amicus is not bound by judgment because not party). But
see infra notes 80-82, and accompanying text.
8oHoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982).
8 Wyatt v. Rawlins, 868 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
82

1d. at 1359.

THE CASE OFJOHN SAL VI

1999]

the litigation and the issues presented; (2) the nature of the amicus;
(3) whether the court has invited the participation of the amicus; (4)
whether the parties object to the amicus; (5) the history of the
participation of the amicus in the litigation and whether that
participation has been helpful to the court; (6) how the amicus has
handled its responsibility in the past; (7) whether participation by the
amicus will be currently helpful to the court and will not prejudice the
parties; and (8) whether 8the
amicus is manipulating that role as a
3
intervention.
for
substitute
Courts in Massachusetts, however, have scarcely addressed the
concept of amicus curiae. In 1875, the Supreme Judicial Court held
that amicus curiae are heard only by leave of court and for the
assistance of the court. 84 Earlier, in 1866, the Supreme Judicial Court
held, in the only other case on point, that amicus curiae can not be
heard where the parties are represented by competent counsel and the
court has not asked for further argument. 85
VII. A SOLUTION GONE AWRY
The court determined that given the circumstances, it was
appropriate to appoint amicus counsel to represent the defendant in
his competency hearing. 86 In an order dated June 29, 1995, Judge
Dortch-Okara appointed an attorney to serve as counsel amicus
curiae to "present arguments,
oral or written, as to the defendant's
87T
competency to stand trial."
The judge determined that amicus counsel can not be partisan,
nor given to the use of a litigant. 88 Without any substantial
precedential authority from the higher courts of Massachusetts, the
judge devised explicit instructions governing the interaction of the
amicus with the defense attorney:
" Id. at 1359-60.

" Martin v. Tapley, 119 Mass. 116, 120 (1875).
" Nauer v. Thomas, 95 Mass. (12 Allen) 572, 574 (1866).
86 See Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to
appoint Amicus Curiae to Litigate Competency Issue, Commonwealth v. Salvi
(Mass. Super. Ct.) (Nos. 99518-24).
87Id. at 6.
8 Id. at 5, quoting 3A C.J.S. Amicus Curiae § 4, 426, n.45.
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[A]micus curiae shall take an objective and neutral role
in his communications with defense counsel. Amicus
curiae is allowed to communicate freely with defense
counsel, to the extent he sees fit, for assistance in
gathering factual data only. Defense counsel and
amicus curiae shall not discuss legal opinions, legal
strategy, or legal conclusions. Amicus curiae shall
interact with defense counsel only to the extent
necessary to gather evidence and to formulate his own
opinions, conclusions, and strategy for the competency
hearing. Again, the role of amicus curiae is that of an
advisor to the court and not of a private attorney for
the defendant. s9
At the competency hearing, the amicus counsel examined and
cross-examined witnesses. 90 He did not discuss legal opinions, legal
strategy, or legal conclusions with the defendant's counsel. 91
Moreover, because the amicus counsel was not, technically,
representing Salvi, he never consulted with Salvi, never had a
confidential relationship with him, and did not believe that an
attorney-client
relationship would exist
between them. 92
Furthermore, because he was not representing Salvi, he could not
waive the attorney-client privilege or turn work product over to the
prosecution. 93 Perhaps most importantly, amicus never attempted to
have Salvi testify at the hearing, because of the court's instructions. 94
At the competency hearing itself, counsel for the defendant
attempted to object to a question. 95 The court instructed counsel that
89Id. at 6.

90 See Affidavit of John H. LaChance, Commonwealth v. Salvi (Mass.
Super. Ct.) (Nos. 99518-24).
91Id.
92 See

id.

9' See Transcript

of Competency Hearing 113.
94 Id. at 2. "I did not attempt to call the defendant as a witness because I
determined that whether the defendant should testify at the proceeding was a
strategic decision which should be made by the defendant in consultation with his
counsel." Id.
9'See Transcript of Competency Hearing 72.
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he was not permitted to participate or object in the hearing. 96 On
multiple occasions during the hearing, counsel attempted to be heard
on the record and was not permitted by the court, despite the express
wishes of amicus counsel. 97 The defendant himself attempted to
address the court, but was also not permitted to speak. 98
This raises the troubling question of whether the defendant was
denied his right to counsel during the competency hearing. 99 It is
clear that amicus counsel was not representing the defendant in any
way, indeed was instructed by the court not to represent the
defendant.100
Counsel for the defendant was not allowed to

MR. CARNEY: I object.
THE COURT: No, sir. Mr. LaChance is handling this matter.
MR. CARNEY: He is acting amicus. I am still acting as my client's attorney.
THE COURT: I will give you a chance in this hearing.
MR. LACHANCE: I object to not hearing from defendant's counsel.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Transcript of Competency Hearing 72.
"MR. LACHANCE: May we approach?
THE COURT: Approach side bar with regard to your matter.
MR. CARNEY: May I approach also?
THE COURT: To listen, sir, not to interject." Transcript of Competency
Hearing 110. See also Defendant's Motion for a New Competency Hearing,
Commonwealth v. Salvi 15 (Mass. Super. Ct.) (Nos. 99518-24).
96 See Defendant's Motion for a New
Competency Hearing, supra note 95,
at 5. See also supra note 89, and accompanying text.
9' See Defendant's Motion for a New Competency Hearing, supra note 95,
at 5. See also supra note 89, and accompanying text.
9"Id. at 1[6. "On two occasions, the defendant had to be removed from the
courtroom because he had persisted in requesting permission to address the
court." Id.
9 See Defendant's Motion for a New Competency Hearing, supra note 95, 1
8. In the motion for a new competency hearing, which was denied, counsel for
the defendant alleged that the lack of representation at the competency hearing
was a violation of the defendant's Constitutional rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments and under Articles X and XII of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. Id.
'0oSee supra note

89 and accompanying text.
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participate. 1 ' The defendant was not allowed to participate. 10 2 The
result was a hearing in which the defendant had absolutely no part. 03
'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Given the conflict faced by defense counsel when they have a
good faith doubt as to the defendant's competence to stand trial but
the defendant wants to be found competent, it seems that use of
amicus counsel may be an appropriate solution. There are seemingly
two modifications that can be made to the procedures employed in
Salvi's case that could resolve the conflict without creating the
problem of nonrepresentation.
The first modification that could be made is that defense counsel
could be allowed to participate in the competency proceedings. The
holding of the court in Salvi's case that amicus' presence precluded
Salvi's counsel from participating appears to be inexplicable. In
seemingly all cases, the involvement of amicus curiae is
supplementary to the representation by counsel for the parties, and it
is contrary to the very nature of amicus curiae to allow them to
supplant one party to the proceedings. 104
The second possible solution would be to adopt a more
expansive definition of the role of amicus curiae. Courts in other
jurisdictions have, when appropriate, adopted an expanded definition
of what amicus curiae can be and do, including at times allowing them
to take an advocacy role.' 05 This seems most appropriate given the
non-adversarial nature of the competency hearing, the sole goal of
which is to allow the court to render a fair assessment of the
defendant's competency. It also seems that this would allow defense
counsel to continue to represent the defendant's wishes without the
risk that the defendant's Constitutional rights are not being
advocated.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
102See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
13 See supra note 99. No appellate court had a chance to rule on the
1o1

propriety of Salvi's competency hearing, as he died after conviction and before
appeal.
'4 See supra note 78, et. seq., and accompanying text.
10 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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Whichever course the courts take in the future, the use of amicus
counsel can play a significant role. The law of amicus curiae must
develop, especially in Massachusetts. As demonstrated, however, the
use of amicus counsel to ensure the constitutionality of criminal
proceedings by preserving the attorney-client relationship and at the
same time ensuring the competency of the defendant is a viable
alternative to the potentially embarrassing spectacles of defendants
proceeding pro se, or the potential expense of new trials following
appeal.
GregoryBrown

